Not as Clean as They Wanna Be: Intermediate Copying in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose by Coats, William S. & Kramer, David H.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 16 | Number 4 Article 2
1-1-1994
Not as Clean as They Wanna Be: Intermediate
Copying in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
William S. Coats
David H. Kramer
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
William S. Coats and David H. Kramer, Not as Clean as They Wanna Be: Intermediate Copying in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 16 Hastings
Comm. & Ent. L.J. 607 (1994).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol16/iss4/2
Not as Clean as They Wanna Be:
Intermediate Copying in Campbell v.
A cuff-Rose
by
WILLIAM S. COATS AND DAVID H. KRAMER*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............................................ 608
II. Copyright Law's Approach to Intermediate Copying ... 612
III. Case Law on Intermediate Copying .................... 614
IV. Digitizing and Infringement ............................. 617
V. Finding a Remedy for Intermediate Copying ........... 618
V I. The Paradox ............................................ 622
V II. Conclusion .............................................. 625
* Mr. Coats and Mr. Kramer are lawyers in the Palo Alto office of Brown & Bain,




The flexible bounds of the fair use defense to copyright infringe-
ment have made for strange bedfellows. In the past few years both
the Reverend Jerry Falwell' and the rap group 2 Live Crew2 have
sought protection under the doctrine which allows use of "copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without consent of the copyright
owner."3 The United States Supreme Court's decision in 2 Live
Crew's case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' was its third on the
question of fair use in the last ten years.5
In Campbell, the Court ruled that the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had misapplied the fair use doctrine in holding that 2 Live
Crew's rap parody "Pretty Woman" was an infringement of Roy
Orbison's copyrighted hit song "Oh Pretty Woman."'6 The Court
unanimously held that the Sixth Circuit improperly viewed the par-
ody's commercial nature as rendering it a presumptively unfair use.'
Such a presumption, the Court stated, is only applicable where a com-
mercial use amounts to verbatim copying, involving no transformation
of the original work.'
In producing its parody, 2 Live Crew apparently "digitally sam-
pled" the Orbison song and incorporated a portion of the original into
its own less pristine version.9 After releasing the rap song on its al-
l. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986)
(fair use where defendant reproduced and distributed unflattering satire of himself for pur-
pose of soliciting financial support for legal action against author).
2. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
3. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989)).
4. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. 1164.
5. The Court's prior fair use decisions were Sony Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
6. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171-76.
7. Id. at 1177.
8. Id. at 1173.
9. The question of sampling was not raised as an independent issue at trial or on
appeal; rather, the issues focused on whether the ultimate production, 2 Live Crew's al-
leged parody, was a fair use of copyrighted material. The Sixth Circuit did note, however,
that Acuff-Rose's musicologist "stated that the [recognizable bass] riff was probably sam-
pled from the original, that is, simply recorded verbatim and them mixed with 2 Live
Crew's additions. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992),
rev'g 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn 1991), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). The trial court
noted that Luther Campbell, a member of 2 Live Crew, admitted he "purposefully copied
selected music and lyrics" from the Orbison song. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754
F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
1164 (1994).
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bum As Clean As They Wanna Be, 2 Live Crew belatedly contacted
the copyright holder of "Oh Pretty Woman," Acuff-Rose Music, offer-
ing a statutory license fee for its use of the work.'" Acuff-Rose re-
fused to accept the fee and sued, claiming 2 Live Crew's unauthorized
use infringed its copyright." In defense, 2 Live Crew argued that
while it had sought a license, in fact no license was necessary because
its work was a fair use parody of the original song.'
2
Unnoticed amidst the attention the case's fair use issue has re-
ceived 13 is that Campbell was the Supreme Court's first glimpse at
digital technology. The ease with which 2 Live Crew was able to ex-
ploit an existing work raises interesting questions about the impact the
new technology will have on copyright protection. The irony of the
case is that 2 Live Crew's defense of parody may not insulate it from
liability. Although ignored by the parties, if 2 Live Crew digitized and
sampled "Oh Pretty Woman," it undoubtedly created one or more in-
termediate copies of the copyrighted work for which 2 Live Crew
could be independently liable.' 4
Digital technology allows an individual to transform the detailed
information and expression contained within any work, whether visual
or musical, into a sequence of bits (binary values of either 0 or 1)
which can be stored as data in a computer.'5 The process allows any-
one with the right equipment to create a perfect "master" of an origi-
10. The parties disputed the timing of the album's release and the group's request for
a license, but the United States Supreme Court found the timing irrelevant. Campbell, 114
S. Ct. at 1168 n.2.
11. Id. at 1168.
12. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1432. 2 Live Crew's disingenuousness on the need for a
license seems to have played a role in the Sixth Circuit's decision against it. See id. at 1432-
33 n.3. In reversing, however, the Supreme Court expressly stated 2 Live Crew's effort to
obtain a license should not be held against it: "[Tihe offer may simply have been made in a
good faith effort to avoid this litigation. If the use is otherwise fair, then no permission
need be sought or granted. Thus, being denied permission to use a work does not weigh
against a fair use." Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174 n.18.
13. A few of the amici in the case included the American Civil Liberties Union, Mad
Magazine, and the Estates of George Gershwin and Cole Porter. Timothy M. Phelps,
Supreme Court Takes Up Parody, NEWSDAY, November 7, 1993, at 19; see also Robert B.
O'Connor, Comment, Rap Parodies?: An In-Depth Look at Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v.
Campbell, 2 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F. 239 (1992).
14. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (lan-
guage of copyright infringement statute "unambiguously encompasses and proscribes 'in-
termediate copying"') (quoting Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir.
1979)). Sega is discussed infra at notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
15. For example in digitizing a painting, a particular shade of green might be repre-
sented by a binary data stream such as 101011101100010101000101. The first eight bits, a
byte, might signal that the remaining data represents a color rather than a brush stroke; the
second byte could specify location of that color in the painting; and the third byte might
represent the specific shade of green used by the artist.
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nal copyrighted work in digital form, from which exact duplicates of
the original can be recreated.
16
Not only does digitization allow creation of perfect copies, it also
permits extensive manipulation of the data sequence of an original
work to create an entirely new work. Indeed, with sufficiently ad-
vanced software programs, such manipulations are merely a matter of
pushing the right buttons. 7 Digital manipulations may utilize much of
the creative expression in a copyrighted work and yet be only faintly
reminiscent of the original. For example, if a copyrighted Mondrian
painting were digitized, an engineer could rearrange the painting's
precise color combinations and shapes to form a work which while
evocative of Mondrian, would nevertheless appear dissimilar from any
of his work. The resulting manipulation would not merely be Mondri-
anesque, but rather would utilize the artist's own creative expression
embodied in his copyrighted original.' 8
The status of such manipulations under copyright law is unclear.
While the ultimate works are in some sense "derived" from the origi-
16. Digital technology can now be used to recreate works in all media. Thus far, how-
ever, only digitization of music, called "sampling," has received attention from commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Newton, Note, Digital Sampling: The Copyright Considerations of
a New Technological Use of Musical Performance, 11 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 671, 713
(1989) (viewing all unauthorized digital sampling as infringement); A. Dean Johnson,
Comment, Music Copyrights: The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in Digital
Sampling Infringement Suits, 21 FLA. ST. L. REV. 135, 164 (1993) (viewing most digital
sampling as permissible fair use of a copyrighted work); Randy S. Kravis, Comment, Does
a Song by Any Other Name Still Sound as Sweet?: Digital Sampling and its Copyright
Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 273-75 (1993) (suggesting a compulsory license for
digital sampling).
In addition, there have been two reported decisions evaluating the propriety of digital
sampling. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (injunction issued prohibiting further sales and requiring defendant to re-
trieve copies of a song containing a digital sample from a copyrighted work); Jarvis v. A &
M Records, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1812 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying summary judgment on non-in-
fringement where defendant sampled two qualitatively significant portions of plaintiff's
copyrighted song).
17. For this reason, digital technology has raised concerns about the reliability of pho-
tographic evidence. See Christine A. Guilshan, Note, A Picture is Worth a Thousand Lies:
Electronic Imaging and the Future of the Admissibility of Photographs Into Evidence, 18
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 365, 371-72 (1992) (digital technology permits virtually
undetectable manipulation of a photograph including the addition or removal of elements
from a scene).
18. Following the initial presentation of this article at the Comm/Ent Law Journal's
Sixth Annual Computer Law Symposium (Feb. 12, 1994), the first copyright infringement
case involving digital manipulation of photographic works was filed in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. FPG Int'l v. Newsday, Inc., 94 Civ. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 16, 1994).
The defendant allegedly digitized and manipulated no fewer than two separate copy-
righted photographs in creating the cover for its November 7, 1993 newspaper. Plaintiffs
alleged fourteen separate counts of willful infringement and are seeking $100,000 per
count, for a total of 1.4 million dollars in statutory damages. Id.
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nal,19 unless they are substantially similar to a copyrighted work, they
are not infringing derivations.2" By sufficiently altering a digitized
"intermediate copy," an individual may capture the essence of an art-
ist's work, yet avoid infringing that artist's copyright. In such cases,
the author of the original work is not compensated for its use, even
though much of his creative effort may be reflected in the digital ma-
nipulation. Moreover, digital manipulations could damage the market
for the artist's own work by making inexpensive, stylistically similar
works available. As authors are deprived of economic rewards for
their efforts, incentives for the creation of original works will
decline.21
19. The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to make or authorize derivative
works from the original. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1993); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir.
1984) (merely basing a new work on a copyrighted original is not an infringement; rather,
the new work must be substantially similar to the prior work); accord Kepner-Tregoe, Inc.
v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1994) (injunction overbroad to the ex-
tent it prohibits defendant from modifying infringing work to eliminate substantially simi-
lar portions; modification which is not substantially similar does not infringe). See also
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.) (work not derivative
unless substantially copied from a prior work), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Harry Fox
Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (work is derivative
"if it is substantially derived from an underlying work and would.., constitute an infringe-
ment ... but for the permission granted ... for its use").
21. Other intellectual property protection may be available to authors whose work is
manipulated in this fashion. For example, an author might bring a claim for trade dress
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. IV 1992). Until 1992, to prove trade dress
infringement, an artist had to show that the visual appearance of his work was non-func-
tional, that it had acquired secondary meaning, and that the defendant's use of the same or
similar artistic style was likely to cause consumer confusion. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's
B.R. Other, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987). A recent Supreme Court decision
expanded the protections of § 1125(a) to eliminate the "secondary meaning" requirement;
protection is now afforded to trade dress which is inherently distinctive whether or not it
has acquired secondary meaning. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Int'l, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2753, 2759 (1992).
Seizing upon the Two Pesos decision, an artist's licensee brought an action claiming
that its posters of the artist's work embodied inherently distinctive trade dress and were
infringed by posters which intentionally imitated the artist's style. Romm Art Creations
Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126, 1130-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Although the de-
fendant's posters were sufficiently different so as to avoid copyright infringement, the court
issued a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant from using the imitative style. Id.
at 1140-41.
If followed, this novel decision risks supplanting copyright law with trade dress protec-
tion as the primary means for protecting imitative artistic works. Trade dress protection is
not limited to a fifty-six year duration as is a copyright and a defendant's work need be
only confusingly similar rather than substantially similar in order to infringe. Lanham
Trademark Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. IV 1992). While such expansive pro-
tection would be a boon to a few often-imitated artists, it could extend an artist's monopoly
beyond socially optimal levels, thereby stifling creativity. See infra part VI; see generally
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994) (recognizing that copyright law grants only a
1994]
This article suggests that creative incentives may be preserved by
analyzing intermediate copying as a separate use of a copyrighted
work. Digital technology permits unauthorized manipulation and se-
lective use of an author's copyrighted expression with unprecedented
ease, allowing the user to develop non-infringing imitations. By view-
ing the initial digital reproduction, indeed any intermediate copy as a
potential infringement, the incentive mechanism at the core of the
United States copyright system may be safeguarded.
Part II of this article briefly describes the United States copyright
framework, demonstrating that unchecked intermediate copying par-
tially undermines the system's goal of promoting the creation of origi-
nal works. Part III reviews the meager case law on the subject of
intermediate copying; the latest case to address the issue supports a
separate copyright analysis of intermediate copying. Part IV discusses
how an infringement analysis of intermediate copying should proceed.
Part V suggests possible remedies for infringing intermediate copies.
Part VI discusses an interesting paradox raised by digital technology
which the Supreme Court has touched upon in two recent copyright
decisions.
II
Copyright Law's Approach to Intermediate Copying
A basic copyright framework is needed to appreciate the implica-
tions of intermediate copying. The United States copyright system
stems from a constitutional provision authorizing Congress to grant
authors exclusive rights to their original works in order to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."22 Congress has exercised
this authority in Title 17, § 106 of the United States Code, endowing
authors of original works with the exclusive right to reproduce the
work in copies;2 3 make derivative works from the original;24 distribute
copies of the work;25 perform the work publicly;26 and display the
work publicly.27
In most cases, use of a copyrighted work without authorization
from the copyright holder is an infringement,28 subjecting the user to
limited monopoly in order ultimately to serve the public good by allowing others to draw
upon existing works).
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
24. Id. § 106(2).
25. Id. § 106(3).
26. Id. § 106(4).
27. Id. § 106(5).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1991 & Supp. IV 1992).
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liability for actual or statutory damages.29 The holder of a valid copy-
right will prevail in an infringement action if he can demonstrate that
a defendant had access to the holder's work and that the defendant
produced a work that is substantially similar in protectable expression
to the copyrighted original.3" Because an author may legally prevent
others from using his work, he is able to reap economic benefits from
it, by either exploiting the work himself or licensing others to do so.
Through this remunerative system, copyright law generates incentives
for the production of original works, thereby serving the constitu-
tional mandate of promoting the useful arts.
In limited cases, the aim of generating incentives for creation of
original works is subordinated to other social policy goals through in-
vocation of the fair use doctrine.31 When a particular use of a copy-
righted work is viewed as socially desirable it is deemed "fair,"
allowing the user to avoid liability to the copyright holder for the
use.
32
Outside the context of fair use, however, all unauthorized repro-
ductions of a copyrighted work infringe an author's exclusive right to
make reproductions. The ultimate purpose of such copies is generally
irrelevant under the Copyright Act.33 Liability does not turn, for ex-
ample, on whether a copy is sold, but simply whether it is
authorized.34
Each uncompensated use of a copyrighted work reduces the fi-
nancial reward which other authors can expect to derive from their
own creations, thus reducing the incentive for creation of original
works. Further damage to incentives results when an author is de-
prived of the ability to control his own work. Some authors may pre-
fer not to create, rather than see elements of their work taken and
utilized by others in an undesirable manner.35 To avoid undermining
copyright law's incentive mechanisms, an author's right to his or her
29. Id. § 504 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
30. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Producs., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
32. The statute provides examples of fair uses including use of a work "for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research." Id.
Case law has privileged uses ranging from parody to private, non-commercial videotaping
of television programs. E.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
33. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501(a) (1991).
34. See Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1984).
35. For example, an artist who photographed flocks of geese for a National Rifle Asso-
ciation calendar might be offended if an anti-hunting organization were able to digitize the
photograph and use the image of the geese in an entirely different setting to oppose
hunting.
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work must be exclusive. Any unauthorized copy of a protected work
must be viewed as a potential infringement.
Ordinarily, it is unnecessary to focus on intermediate copying to
preserve creative incentives. A final work which draws on such copies
is likely itself to be an infringement of the copyrighted original. In
certain instances, however, the final work does not infringe, either be-
cause it is a fair use, or because it is sufficiently dissimilar from the
original. In those cases, the direction of the law is to permit an author
to seek redress for intermediate copying of his work.
Ill
Case Law on Intermediate Copying
Courts have seldom addressed the issue of intermediate copying
squarely.36 In its first decision on the issue, Walker v. University
Books,3 7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the suggestion
that intermediate copying warrants analysis as a separate use of a
copyrighted work. The plaintiff in Walker owned the copyright on a
set of "I-Ching" cards, used to aid instruction of Chinese fortune tell-
ing.38 The defendant had prepared camera-ready blue prints of cards
identical to the plaintiff's, but had not yet produced its own cards.39
The United States District Court viewed the blue prints as mere prep-
arations by the defendant, not themselves a reproduction of the plain-
tiff's work and thus not an infringement of her copyright. 40 Rejecting
this view, the Ninth Circuit stated, "the fact that an allegedly infring-
ing copy of a protected work may itself be only an inchoate represen-
tation of some final product to be marketed commercially does not in
itself negate the possibility of infringement."' 4' Recognizing that such
intermediate copies could harm creative incentives, the appellate
court properly identified the inquiry with respect to such copying as
simply whether the defendant used the copyrighted work without au-
thorization.42 Because the defendant's blue prints were not author-
36. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1993)
(discussing numerous cases ostensibly involving intermediate copying, none of which di-
rectly address the permissibility of the activity). Sega is discussed infra at notes 49-63 and
accompanying text.
37. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979).
38. Id. at 861.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 863.
41. Id. at 864; accord Walt Disney Producs. v. Filmation Assocs. 628 F. Supp. 871, 876-
77 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (fact that infringing intermediate copies of Disney characters had not
yet been incorporated into an ultimate work does not preclude the possibility of
infringement).
42. Walker, 602 F.2d at 864.
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ized by the plaintiff, the Walker panel reversed the lower court's grant
of summary judgment of non-infringement and remanded the case for
a determination of whether the blue prints themselves were
infringing.43
Walker marked a high point for judicial recognition of intermedi-
ate copying as potential infringement. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's
subsequent decision in See v. Durang" gave short shrift to the sugges-
tion that intermediate copying could infringe an author's exclusive
rights. In See, the district court had determined that the defendant's
play was sufficiently dissimilar from the plaintiff's as to avoid copy-
right infringement.45 The plaintiff then sought discovery of drafts of
the defendant's play on the theory that the drafts could reflect greater
similarity to her own work and thus might infringe her copyright.46
The court denied the discovery request, ruling that the earlier versions
sought by the plaintiff could not support an infringement claim where
the play ultimately produced was non-infringing.47 In so doing, the
court implicitly condoned intermediate copying stating that "[c]opying
deleted or so disguised as to be unrecognizable is not copying."
48
It appears that the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed support for
Walker in its latest decision on the issue of intermediate copying, Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.."9 In Accolade, the plaintiff held the
copyright to a video game computer program containing a code which
allowed the game to be played in Sega's game console.50 The code
itself was unprotectable expression, free for anyone to use.51 In order
to ascertain what the code was, however, a competitor needed to re-
verse engineer the Sega programs, making several copies of them in
the process.52 The defendant, Accolade, engaged in this reverse engi-
neering and discovered the code that it then used in its own game
programs.53 Accolade's final programs were not infringements of
Sega's copyright, however, as they utilized only an unprotectable
piece of Sega's code.54
43. Id.
44. 771 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983).




49. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
50. Id. at 1514.
51. Id. at 1524 n.7.
52. Id. at 1514-15.
53. Id. at 1515-16.
54. Id. at 1524 n.7.
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Sega brought a copyright infringement action based on the inter-
mediate copies Accolade made to gain access to the code.55 Relying
on the See decision, 6 Accolade defended its intermediate copying by
claiming it was permissible where the ultimate work produced was
noninfringing5 7 Citing the "unambiguous language of the [Copyright]
Act," the circuit court stated that "intermediate copying ... may in-
fringe the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner ... regard-
less of whether the end product of the copying also infringes."58 In so
doing, the court reflected a preference for the Walker approach,59
rather than the See approach' to intermediate copies, viewing such
copies as potentially infringing uses.6 1
To say, as the Accolade court did, that intermediate copying may
infringe, is not to say that it does. Indeed, the Accolade panel held
Accolade's intermediate copying to be fair use, viewing its reverse en-
gineering as necessary to access the unprotectable expression in Sega's
program.62 The decision to privilege Accolade's intermediate copies
was not based upon the noninfringing status of Accolade's ultimate
computer programs. Rather, the decision simply analyzed the inter-
mediate copying as its own use of a copyrighted work, which under
the facts of this case was fair.63
55. Id. at 1516-17.
56. See discussion of See v. Durang supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 1518.
58. Id. at 1519.
59. Walker is discussed supra at notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
60. See is discussed supra at notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
61. While noting the Walker decision as relevant, the Accolade court viewed the issue
as one of first impression, apparently drawing a distinction between an intermediate copy
of computer code and an intermediate copy of "I-Ching" cards. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519.
The court did not, however, address the seemingly contradictory holding of See.
62. Id. at 1518, 1527-28.
63. Id. at 1527. Despite the apparent thrust of the Sega decision, it appears that an
intermediate copy cannot be analyzed wholly without regard to the ultimate work. Under
the Copyright Act's fair use provisions, the purpose to which a copy is put and the effect of
that copy on the market for the copyrighted work are factors a court must consider in
assessing the applicability of the privilege. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). In
order to evaluate the purpose behind an intermediate copy, a court must necessarily ex-
amine the use to which that copy was put. Indeed, in Sega, the court viewed the intermedi-
ate copying as fair in part because it enabled Accolade to develop products which
complemented rather than competed with the copyright holder's products. Sega, 977 F.2d
at 1523-24. Thus, the status of the ultimate work may influence the analysis of an interme-
diate copy. See also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 538 (5th
Cir. 1994) (broad injunction against future infringement limited to permit defendant to sell
modified versions of its infringing program which, while derived from an infringement,
were not themselves substantially similar).
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IV
Digitizing and Infringement
As digital technology becomes more accessible and non-infring-
ing manipulations more prevalent, a copyright holder may be forced
to protect his work by suing for infringement based on intermediate
copies. As the Accolade decision demonstrates, however, viewing in-
termediate copies as a use of a copyrighted work does not determine
whether that use is infringing.
While the Accolade opinion mandates that an intermediate copy
receive its own infringement analysis, the separate analysis may in-
volve examination of the use to which the intermediate copy is ulti-
mately put.64 In cases where the work ultimately produced is a fair
use, it seems logical to view a requisite intermediate copy as itself fair.
The fair use privilege attaches to a work by virtue of a congressional
and judicial determination that the work is one which ought to be en-
couraged, the author's copyright notwithstanding.65 In such cases, the
need to safeguard creative incentives must yield to a purpose which
society views as superior. Given the desire to see fair use works pro-
duced, a copyright holder may not be entitled to claim infringement
from intermediate copies necessary to create them.
This issue lurks between the lines of the Campbell case. Presum-
ably a digitized, intermediate copy of the Orbison song was made by 2
Live Crew as an essential step in producing its "parody. ' 66 If the par-
ody is ultimately found to be sufficiently desirable to warrant fair use
protection, what effect does that finding have on the intermediate
copy? To view the copy as infringing would undercut a determination
that the parody is a socially desirable fair use. Future parodists would
be discouraged from producing similarly desirable works, fearing lia-
bility for copyright infringement. Thus, in order to encourage socially
desirable fair uses, it appears that intermediate copying which is nec-
essary to produce those uses should also be ruled fair.67
Under current interpretation of the fair use doctrine, this result is
by no means clear. Unlike the finished product, the intermediate copy
is not itself a parody, nor anything other than a verbatim translation of
64. See id.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
66. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
67. As another example, television drama critics often videotape entire copyrighted
plays from which a few scenes are later drawn for use in reviews. The critical review is
undoubtedly a non-infringing fair use of the featured play, therefore, should not the earlier
video recording of the play also be non-infringing? Arguably, the critic might also defend
himself using the rationale of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 456 (1984), which allowed private viewers to "time-shift" broadcasts.
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the original into digital form.68 Nevertheless, the rationale underlying
the fair use doctrine could support an argument that intermediate dig-
itized copies are a fair use in this context.
Unlike the situation where the ultimate work produced is a fair
use, when an intermediate copy of a protected work is digitally
manipulated into a new, non-infringing work, there may be no social
policy rationale overriding the need to protect creative incentives.
While digital manipulations may nominally add to the store of creative
works, their unchecked production would undermine creative incen-
tives by depriving authors of control over and rewards for their origi-
nal efforts. 69  Based upon the Ninth Circuit's view in Walker and
Accolade, intermediate copies may be viewed as infringing in such
cases, to prevent the appropriation and manipulation of an author's
original expression.7"
V
Finding a Remedy for Intermediate Copying
As uncertain as the issue of liability for intermediate copying is,
equally unclear, is the question of what remedy should be available
when such copying is deemed infringing.
Section 502(a) of the Copyright Act specifically empowers a court
"to grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may
deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright."'"
Courts have exercised this statutory discretion in intermediate copy-
ing cases and enjoined not only intermediate copying but also the dis-
tribution and sale of products developed from the infringing activity.72
68. See Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (D.D.C. 1985) (verbatim translation
of article in foreign language is an infringing derivative work); see also supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
69. See infra Part VI. See also Justice Kennedy's thoughtful concurrence in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1180-82 (1994).
70. Should an individual who makes an intermediate copy and manipulates it into a
non-infringing, new work be treated differently from one who merely views a copyrighted
work and develops the same, non-infringing new work from memory? If intermediate cop-
ies are infringing, the first individual is liable for copyright infringement, the second indi-
vidual is not. It may be argued that disparate treatment is warranted because the copier
was able to save time producing his new work and thus derived an additional benefit from
the original for which he should compensate the author. This argument, however, would
effectively result in compensating the original author for the effort he expended in creating
his work, a position squarely rejected by the Supreme Court. See Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991) (copyright law does not protect an author's
"sweat of the brow").
71. 17 U.S.C. 502(a) (1988).
72. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 514, 524 (9th Cir. 1993)
(enjoining computer servicing company from performing any computer maintenance in-
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In SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, 3 for example,
after the termination of the parties' license agreement, the defendant
continued to use plaintiff's copyrighted computer code and developed
a competing product.74 The defendant attempted to cure its infringe-
ment by concealing the copied expression. 75 Applying the theory of
unjust enrichment, the United States District Court permanently en-
joined the "marketing and distribution of" the sanitized product:
Obviously, the Court cannot turn back the clock and prevent [de-
fendant] from making impermissible use of those [copyrighted]
materials. It can, however, put the parties in the same position they
would be in had [defendant] complied with the license agreement.
Had [defendant] done so, it would not have developed its present
product, or at the very least, not in its present form and not in the
time actually required. It would not, therefore, be in a position to
market that product, and hence the Court should not allow it to do
SO.
7 6
As a matter of equity, in intermediate copying cases, one could
argue that a court should have discretion to enjoin sales of the final
product, even if it is non-infringing. 77 Any other finding would effec-
tively reward unlawful activity. Indeed, the Copyright Act has been
interpreted as contemplating injunctive relief as a means of barring
infringing activity even before a final product has issued.7"
In some circumstances, a prohibition on continued sales arguably
may be the only effective remedy. The intermediate copying may
prove so pervasive and so fundamental to the development process
that the only way to protect the copyright holder's interests may be to
enjoin the sale of imitations developed by means of systematic in-
fringement and manipulation. As a rule, courts attempt to draw in-
junctions narrowly to enjoin only the use of the protected expression.
When infringing and non-infringing material are inextricably inter-
volving copyrighted software; loading software violates copyright); Hubco Data Products
Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450, 454, 457-58 (1983) (granting pre-
liminary injunction).
73. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
74. Id. at 820-22.
75. Id. at 823, 831.
76. Id. at 833.
77. See, e.g., Merton Co. v. Tony Trading of Hong Kong, Ltd., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1156, 1158
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (enjoining distribution of product whether or not infringing where sale
orders were procured using infringing sample).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (authorizing injunctions to prevent infringement); see Salinger
v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (directing district court to issue
preliminary injunction restraining publication of biography containing infringing material);
see also Walt Disney Producs. v. Filmation Assocs. 628 F. Supp. 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986)




twined, however, courts may enjoin the dissemination of the entire
work, even though this remedy prevents the defendant from benefit-
ting from its own original contributions. 79 As the Ninth Circuit has
noted, the balance of equities surrounding the issuance of an injunc-
tion should weigh against the infringer:
In fashioning relief, the district court should not be overly con-
cerned with the prospective harm to [defendant]. A defendant has
no right to expect a return on investment from activities which vio-
late the copyright laws. Once a determination has been made that
an infringement is involved, the continued 8Profitability of [defend-
ant's] business [] is of secondary concern.
On the other hand, broad injunctive relief would contradict a fun-
damental limitation of copyright, namely that it protect only the au-
thor's original expression. 81  If intermediate copies are used to
prepare a non-infringing final work, why should copyright law pro-
hibit sale of the modification which is by definition, original, creative,
and itself worthy of copyright protection? To provide injunctive relief
against such non-infringing manipulations is to extend copyright pro-
tection to the unprotectable ideas in a work.
In Kepner- Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc.,82 the defend-
ant appealed from a judgment enjoining it not only from future in-
fringement, but also from selling any modifications of its infringing
work, regardless of whether the modified work was itself an infringe-
ment.83 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found the injunction over-
broad to the extent that it precluded the defendant from modifying its
program to produce a version that was not substantially similar to the
copyrighted work. 4 The court held:
Under copyright law, the district court could enjoin only those fu-
ture versions of MPO that are substantially similar to K-T's Li-
censed Materials. LSI is free to continue its efforts to devise a non-
79. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1940) (appor-
tioning damages based on percentage of infringing material in motion picture; not dis-
turbing injunction barring exhibition); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F.
Supp. 672, 686 n.14, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (granting injunction; "[when... it is technologi-
cally impossible to separate out the infringing material the copyright owner ought not go
unprotected.").
80. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981)
(granting.injunction), rev'd on other grounds, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1988). See also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership
Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1994).
82. 12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1994).
83. Id. at 531.
84. Id. at 538.
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infringing management training program, notwithstanding any ex-
pansive language in the district court's opinion to the contrary.
85
The likelihood of a copyright holder seeking an injunction to pre-
vent intermediate copying is remote, however. In most cases, the
existence of intermediate copying will be discovered, if at all, only well
after the copying has taken place.86 In such circumstances, if copy-
right infringement occurred, a variety of damage awards may be made
available to the copyright holder.
Under the Copyright Act, an infringer is liable either for statu-
tory damages87 or for the plaintiff's actual damagesplus his own prof-
its, unaccounted for in the actual damages computation.88 The latter
standard has proved complicated.89 The question of intermediate
copying merely adds to an already confusing analysis.
One could certainly view an infringing intermediate copy as a
prerequisite to the finished work, making the ultimate work "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Under this view, the copyright holder could be
entitled to a recovery based on the defendant's sales of a non-infring-
ing finished product. Damages would cover sales lost by the copyright
holder plus non-duplicative profits of the defendant. Of course, if the
85. Id. The court did not mention Sega v. Accolade or the possible inconsistency with
the approach to intermediate copying taken by the Ninth Circuit in Sony.
86. If the ultimate work is not substantially similar to the original, one wonders how a
copyright holder would discover that his work had been improperly reproduced. Perhaps
the author would recognize elements of his particular style embodied in the final work
which the ordinary person would not notice. But see Walt Disney Producs. v. Filmation
Assocs. 628 F. Supp. 871, 874 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (copyright holder made aware of infringing
intermediate copies by virtue of their use in defendant's advertising and promotional
materials). The sanctions available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11,
would make the filing of an action based on such limited information very risky; yet it may
be the only way for a copyright holder to protect himself. The copyright holder's litigation
counsel may be placed in a serious dilemma in filing an action for copyright infringement
based upon very speculative evidence. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994), increases the risk to plaintiffs who may be liable for
the defendant's attorneys fees in an unsuccessful action. If plaintiffs are deterred by such
factors, however, potential infringers will go unpunished.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
88. Id. § 504(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
89. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, a court must first determine plaintiff's actual
damages by attempting to estimate what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for use
of a copyrighted work. See, e.g., Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772
F.2d 505, 512 (9th Cir. 1985). The court must then add the infringer's profits traceable to
the infringement, calculated by subtracting his costs from his sales of the work. Id. at 514.
In addition, the defendant's "indirect profits" from the infringement are available. Id. at
517. Only a portion of the infringer's profits are recoverable however; a percentage com-




"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is applicable, an injunction such
as discussed above may be justified under existing law.90
Alternatively, where the final work does not itself infringe the
copyrighted work, the copyright holder may suffer no damage from its
production. The defendant does not sell the infringing intermediate
copies, thus, no sales of the copyrighted work are lost because of cop-
ies. Unless the plaintiff can show that the defendant's final product
usurps sales of the copyrighted work, damages for infringement may
be de minimis.
Statutory damages are a third potential copyright remedy. In-
deed, this is the remedy discussed by the Walker court for infringing
intermediate copies.9' Under the Act, a copyright holder may forego
pursuit of actual damages and seek to recover an award under
§ 504(c). 92 A judge has the discretion to award from $500 to
$20,000.93 Where the copyright holder can prove that infringement
was willful rather than innocent, as may often be the case with inter-




As discussed earlier, the United States copyright system stems
from a constitutional provision authorizing Congress to grant authors
exclusive rights to their original works in order "[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts."95 Case law has repeatedly recog-
nized, however, that the copyright system rewards authors not as an
end in itself, but rather to serve the public good by allowing access to
creative works.96 As a result, copyright questions raised by new tech-
nologies should be resolved in a way that best serves the law's ulti-
mate purpose.
In most instances, extending copyright protection to cover new
technological uses of a copyrighted work advances the goal of increas-
ing the number of creative works. The greater the copyright protec-
90. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
91. Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d at 864. It is also the remedy sought by the
plaintiff in FPG Int'l v. Newsday, Inc., 94 Civ. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 16, 1994).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a),(c).
93. Id. § 504(c).
94. Id.
95., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
96. The Supreme Court has stated: "The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good." Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (citations omitted).
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tion the greater the financial reward for creativity and the more likely
an individual is to create a new work. As the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Campbell, however, at some point increasing copyright pro-
tection actually stifles production of new works by preventing others
from drawing upon existing works to develop their own new cre-
ations.97 The Court cautioned that a restrictive interpretation of the
fair use doctrine could stifle creativity by preventing authors from
transforming existing works:
[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus
lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing
space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.
98
Another Supreme Court copyright decision, issued only days
before the Campbell opinion, is in accord:
We have often recognized that the monopoly privileges that Con-
gress has authorized, while "intended to motivate the creative activ-
ity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,"
are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good. 99







Level of Copyright Protection
97. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169 (1994).
98. Id. at 1171 (citation omitted). Elsewhere in the opinion the Court quoted Justice
Story's language from a classic opinion making essentially the same point: "Every book in
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was
well known and used before." Id. at 1169, quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
99. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029 (1994). In Fogerty, the Court ruled
that awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in copyright actions should be available
to defendants under the same standard as applies to plaintiffs. Id. at 1033. The court
rejected the dual standard which had been used by several circuits, stating that it was
equally important to encourage defendants to litigate meritorious defenses and ensure that
the limited copyright monopoly is properly demarcated. Id. at 1030.
1994]
In the absence of any copyright protection, a number of works would
be produced by those who create purely for the non-pecuniary enjoy-
ment which creation itself provides [Point A on the graph]. As copy-
right protection increases, more authors are persuaded to produce by
the promise of financial gain. To realize the maximum number of new
works, copyright protection should be set at a level where the number
of works gained from heightened incentives is precisely offset by the
number lost when individuals, fearing infringement, are unwilling to
produce works drawing upon those already existing [Point X on the
graph].'
Digital technology is an enigma in light of this tension in copy-
right law. It may greatly enhance the creative process yielding count-
less new, transformative works, but if original works may be
manipulated at will, the technology may diminish creative incentives,
actually reducing the number of new works.
Cases involving digital technology will grapple with the paradox
when evaluating the permissibility of intermediate copying. In order
to prepare a digital manipulation, an individual must first digitize the
copyrighted work. This initial digitization, a verbatim translation of
the original work into computer language, would traditionally be
viewed as copyright infringement; thus preserving creative incentives
by providing authors with some remedy for unauthorized use of their
work.'' If intermediate copying is deemed an infringement, however,
society will be unable to recognize digital technology's limitless poten-
tial for generating new works. Therefore, it may be desirable to per-
mit such copying where the ultimate work produced from the copy is
sufficiently different so as not to infringe the original work's copyright.
In the near future, courts will be asked to determine which ap-
proach to intermediate copying should be adopted. The answer to
that question will require an evaluation of the current level of copy-
right protection. Is that protection reflected by Point B on the graph
so that ruling intermediate copying an infringement (heightening
copyright protection and creative incentives) would increase produc-
100. See generally Wyham M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). The entirety of copyright law may be ex-
plained under this simple model. Under the fair use doctrine, for example, individuals are
permitted to use a copyrighted work in certain socially desirable ways, without incurfing
liability for infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The doctrine permits use of a work "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or re-
search." Id. Thus, the doctrine effectively increases the number of new works by reducing
the protection which a copyright holder enjoys on his work. Graphically, the fair use doc-
trine moves society from Point C on the graph toward Point X.
101. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); see also supra notes 33-35, 41 and accompanying text.
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tion of creative works, or is the current level of protection Point C, in





Digital technology is adding another layer of complexity to copy-
right law. Through digitization, the media of music, video, and art all
may be transformed into easily manipulated computer code. As the
Second Circuit noted in Computer Associates v. Altai,10 3 applying
copyright law to computer code may be akin to trying to squeeze a
round peg into a square hole. 1°4 The resulting imprecise fit may have
harmful consequences for the creative incentives established by copy-
right law. To protect those incentives, courts may view "intermediate
copies" made in the digitization process as themselves uses of a copy-
righted work. At the same time, courts must be mindful of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions noting the tension between promot-
ing such incentives and serving copyright's ultimate goal of generating
new creative works. If intermediate copying is always viewed as in-
fringement, digital technology's unparalleled potential will never be
realized.
102. Conversely, if intermediate copying is deemed a permissible use of a copyrighted
work, does that move us back toward equilibrium, or beyond it?
103. 986 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 712.
1994]

